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evidence from a field experiment 
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This study econometrically asses the presence of a tipping point on ethnic discrimination in the rental 
housing market. We measure discrimination and access to housing in New Caledonia by a large field 
experiment. Between 2015 and 2017, we sent six applications in response to 741 real-estate rental ads, 
for a total of 3,616 responses. Applicants have European, Kanak (the indigenous people) and Wallisian 
name and various signal of stability. Using data from the local census, we link the location of the offer 
and the neighbourhood composition. Probit random intercept regressions show that ethnic 
discrimination is stronger in neighbourhoods that are around the tipping point in ethnic composition. 
 
Key words: discrimination, rental market, tipping-point 
JEL Codes: J15 R23 C93 
 
This research was supported by the French National Research Agency - Grant  DALTON ANR-15-CE28-
0004) and by the University of New-Caledonia. We are grateful to Tuamanaia FOIMAPAFISI for her 
assistance. 
 
 
 
                                               
1  Sylvain CHAREYRON, Université Paris-Est, ERUDITE (EA 437), TEPP-CNRS (FR 3435), UPEC, UPEM, F-94010, Créteil, France, 
sylvain.chareyron@u-pec.fr 
2 Samuel GOROHOUNA, Université de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, LARJE (EA 3329), samuel.gorohouna@unc.nc 
3 Yannick L’HORTY, Université Paris-Est, ERUDITE (EA 437), TEPP-CNRS (FR 3435), UPEC, UPEM, F-77454 Marne-La-Vallée 
France, yannick.lhorty@u-pem.fr .  
4 Pascale PETIT, Université Paris-Est, ERUDITE (EA 437), TEPP-CNRS (FR 3435), UPEC, UPEM, F-77454 Marne-La-Vallée France. 
pascale.petit@u-pem.fr. 
5Catherine RIS, Université de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, LARJE (EA 3329), catherine.ris@unc.nc 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
While there is a growing number of studies measuring discrimination in access to housing, there is still 
too little interest in the determinants of such discrimination, particularly the role played by the local 
composition of inhabitants in the local context. This effect could play a major impact on the 
segregation dynamic if discriminations affect more individuals belonging to ethnic minorities when 
they try to access a neighbourhood composed mainly of individuals from the major ethnicity. This 
phenomenon could occur if landlords have the will to maintain ethnic homogeneity in this type of 
neighbourhood in order to avoid outflows of individuals from the main ethnic group. Card, Mas, and 
Rothstein (2008) showed that in the United-States, white populations tend to leave cities with minority 
shares between 5% and 20%. As advocated by Hanson and Hawley (2011), landlords may want to 
prevent this phenomenon and, therefore, be more likely to discriminate in neighbourhoods which are 
close to the tipping point. While it is generally accepted that discrimination can reinforce residential 
segregation, the inverse link between local socio-ethnic composition and the intensity of 
discrimination is less explored. The question is whether discrimination amplifies the effect of 
segregating mechanisms or whether it reduces them. 
To our knowledge, this article is the first to econometrically asses the presence of a tipping point of 
the ethnic discrimination in the rental housing market in an European context. We use a dataset of 
3,616 observations created from a large field experiment to determine the relationship between ethnic 
discrimination in the rental housing market and the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood in New 
Caledonia. In this way, using census dataset from ISEE6, each observation is related to information on 
the composition of the neighbourhood in which the housing is located. 
The scope of the study is the Greater Noumea, the capital of the French territory of New Caledonia. 
Three types of profile are tested: the Kanak, the Wallisian and the European applicant. These ethnic 
groups represent respectively 23 percent, 12 percent and 34 percent of the population in the 
agglomeration.7 New Caledonia and more particularly the Greater Noumea area, has several aspects 
that are particularly interesting for our research project. First of all, it is both a European and Pacific 
territory, an ultra-peripheral one. Discrimination in access to housing has been little studied in Europe 
in relation to the United States. Secondly, it is the only territory in the French republican space, with 
French Polynesia, where we have ethnic statistics, which allow us to measure local ethnic distributions. 
We use these statistics to compare them with data from a discrimination test. Finally, the Nouméa 
agglomeration, where we are located, is a territory where the potentially discriminated population 
varies locally from a small minority to a large majority. We therefore have a wide spatial variety for 
                                               
6 Institut de la statistique et des études économiques Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
7 The rest of the population of the Greater Nouméa agglomeration are methis (10%), other ethnic groups (17%) and 
undeclared (3%). 
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our variable of interest, the local socio-ethnic composition. The high level of segregation in the 
Nouméa agglomeration means that it is perfectly suited for studying the link between ethnic 
environment and discrimination. In the southern part of this agglomeration, the share of the Kanak 
population is only 5 percent, whereas in the northern part of the agglomeration, which is only ten 
kilometers away, this proportion reaches 50 percent. Two signals of stability are also introduced, 
namely being civil servant and returning from Metropolitan France, in order to distinguish between 
the two core types of discrimination, which are: discrimination based on information and 
discrimination based on preferences.  
The results indicate a strong discrimination against the Kanak applicant and even more against the 
Wallisian applicant. A stability signals increase the response rate more substantially for the Kanak 
applicant than for the European applicant, suggesting that both mechanisms driving discrimination are 
relevant, i.e. preference and information. We show that the discrimination against the Kanak applicant 
is highest in neighbourhoods where the concentration of Europeans is between 60% and 72%. 
However, we find no statistically significant links between discrimination and the concentration of 
Wallisians or Kanaks. 
The next section of the paper describes the context of the study. Section 2 is a discussion of the 
previous research on the presence of a tipping point on the discrimination in the housing market. 
Section 3 describes the experimental protocol and the data collection. Section 4 presents the results 
of the experiment and section 5 discuss the robustness of the results. We conclude in the final section 
of the paper. 
 
1. Social and ethnic context of New Caledonia 
 New Caledonia is one of the South Pacific region‘s largest economies. It sets itself apart from other 
French overseas communities and islands of Oceania by its high living standard and advanced human 
development. The last 25 years have been marked by important social and economic progress. 
However, Caledonian society is characterised by substantial inequalities. The standard of living 
increased at an annual rate of 1.3 per cent from 1991 to 2008, accompanied by deepening inequalities. 
In 2008, the standard of living of the richest 10 per cent was 7.9 times higher than the standard of 
living of the poorest 10 per cent. Ethnic background of inequalities is here very strong. 
Indeed, similar to its neighbours, which have experienced comparable colonial settlements (Australia 
and New Zealand in particular), New Caledonia is characterized by cultural heterogeneity; Kanak 
(indigenous people) represent approximately 40 per cent of the population, compared with 12 per 
cent of other Pacific populations, 27 per cent of Europeans and 3 per cent of Asians. In these countries, 
groups suffering from lower socio-economic outcomes and discrimination are not immigrant 
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minorities. That is, in New Caledonia, Kanak are the majority compared with other ethnic groups in the 
country. New Caledonia also differs from most European countries in that ethnic groups are identified 
in official statistics; eight of the nine censuses held in New Caledonia since World War II (2004 is the 
exception) identify ethnic groups, which highlight the need for policies aimed to reduce gaps in social 
inequalities. This makes it possible to draw the ethnic composition of each neighbourhood and thus 
link discrimination in access to housing and ethnic segregation by place of residence. 
Since the early 1990s, policies intended to reduce inequality have been implemented. Substantial 
social and economic policies favouring Kanak have accompanied the Accord de Noumea (signed in 
1998) and, before that, the Accords de Matignon (signed in 1988). In relation to “closing the gap” 
policies and Kanak access to positions of responsibility in all areas of activity, rebalancing policies are 
most conspicuous in the areas of education and employment through the implementation of training 
programs, development of infrastructures and local employment protection policy. A more equitable 
distribution of resources, opportunities and power among ethnic groups is essential to ensure 
economic and social development of New Caledonia because high inequality threatens a country’s 
political stability, especially in this period of the history of New Caledonia (referendum on 
independence being held in 2018). 
Although dramatic progress has been made in the area of school achievement, socio-economic 
indicators still differ widely across ethnic groups; Kanak remaining socially disadvantaged and 
discriminated on the labor market (Gorohouna et al., 2013). Bunel et al. (2017) sow the differences in 
average socio-professional status by ethnic group, highlighting significant differences in level of school 
achievement and status on the job market. 
Noumea, like many other Pacific cities, has remained for a long time a white city. Kanak remain very 
much in the minority in the Greater Noumea (about 10% in the early 1950s). From decades following, 
the phenomenon of urbanization of the indigenous population has increased and stabilized since the 
1980s. As shown on Figure 1, the share of the urban Kanak population continues to increase; within 
the agglomeration, Kanak account for about one in four inhabitants. 
Figure 1. Evolution of Kanak population in cities. 
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Wallisians and Futunians are the third largest community in the population of New Caledonia (8.6%) 
after Kanak and Europeans. Coming from several waves of immigration since the 1940s but also a high 
birth rate among this population, they are now more numerous than in Wallis and Futuna. Wallisians 
and Futunians are mainly present in Greater Nouméa (12.29% of the population) and more particularly 
in the three communes of the suburbs (Mont-Dore, Dumbéa and Païta). 
New Caledonia is also characterized by a high level of ethnic and social segregation, in particular in the 
Greater Nouméa agglomeration, which includes the four most populated municipalities of New 
Caledonia: Nouméa, Mont Dore, Païta, and Dumbéa. Some 60% of the population and 73% of the jobs 
in the archipelago are concentrated in this area. The southern neighborhoods, with a very small 
proportion of social housing, very good quality and significantly more expensive rental housing, are 
predominantly European, sharply contrast with the northern neighborhoods, which are predominantly 
Kanak and characterized by a relatively high proportion of unsanitary housing and social housing. For 
the sake of social justice, promoting mixed neighbourhoods could fight against socio-economic and 
spatial segregation. This issue often goes along with by mobility, due to the distance of some 
neighbourhoods to business and employment places: the cost, the unreliability and the unavailability 
of public transport and the cost of the automobile constitute major obstacles to access to employment. 
By applying the usual Duncan and Duncan index of dissimilarity for the two groups, European and 
Kanak, Bunel et al (2017) measure the degree of segregation in the urban area of Nouméa and obtain 
an index of 50.8. That means one have to change of neighborhoods more than 50% of Kanak in order 
to produce a distribution that matches that of the European. 
 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
1956 1969 1989 2009
Proportion of Kanak in the population of Greater Noumea
Proportion of urban Kanak in the whole Kanak population
6 
 
2. Overview of the literature  
To objectively measure discrimination in access to housing, as well as in access to employment or other 
markets, the method used in the international literature is the testing method, which consists in 
comparing the responses obtained in response to a property advertisement by two candidates who 
are similar in all respects except for the characteristic whose effect is to be tested. This method has 
been applied in the United States since the 1980s and has provided multiple experimental evidence of 
discrimination in access to housing, particularly for the most studied ethno-racial discrimination 
(Yinger, 1986; Page, 1995; Choi et al., 2005; Hanson & Hawley, 2011). It has also been applied, to a 
lesser extent, in many European countries: first in Sweden by Ahmed et al, (2008 and 2010), Bengtsson 
et al, (2012) and Carlsson & Eriksson (2014), then in Spain by Bosch et al (2010), in Italy by Baldini & 
Federici (2011), in Greece by Drydakis (2011), in Norway by Beatty and Sommervoll (2012), in Belgium, 
by Heylen et al (2015), in France by Acolin, Bostic, and Painter (2016), and in Germany by Auspurg, 
Hinz, and Schmid (2017). With the widespread use of the Internet and real estate ad sites, the 
correspondence test, which consists of sending fictitious request emails, has emerged as the most 
effective way to conduct tests on the housing market. In a recent overview, Flage (2018) identifies 29 
scientific studies that have applied this method in 15 different countries. It concludes that candidates 
who report a foreign origin by the sound of their surname are on average half as likely to be invited to 
visit rented accommodation as majority candidates.  
In this field of research, there has been an impressive increase in the number of publications. Most of 
these publications focus on proving the existence and measuring the intensity of discrimination. They 
highlight that minorities are victims of differential treatment in the real estate market. Overall, visible 
minority candidates are contacted less often and the number and quality of assets referred to them is 
lower.  
For economists, in particular, the identification of discrimination indicates an anomaly in the 
functioning of the housing market and the existence and extent of such an anomaly is an interesting 
subject in itself. But it is clear that we must go further and explain the origin and causes of this type of 
anomaly if we want to be able to propose actions to effectively combat this type of problem. In this 
perspective, too little work is done on the determinants, let alone on how to fight discrimination.  
We focus here on an essential determinant: the local socio-ethnic composition. This corresponds to 
the proportion of potential discriminated persons in the local population, which is frequently 
measured with segregation indices, such as Duncan and Duncan, which is one of the most widely used. 
Discrimination has multiple relationships with the local segregation thus measured. On the one hand, 
it is clear that strong discrimination on the basis of socio-ethnic origin can strengthen and amplify the 
processes that generate and maintain local ethnic segregation. On the other hand, local ethnic 
segregation can in turn influence the intensity of discrimination. We are interested in this particular 
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meaning of causality, which ranges from segregation to discrimination. When the potentially 
discriminated minority is very present locally, does this promote or limit discrimination? It seems to us 
that the answer to this question is not obvious. However, this is an important question if we want to 
know whether discriminatory behaviour in access to housing is more a role as an amplifier or 
attenuator of socio-spatial segregation.  
Three sets of determinants have been given by the literature applied to the question of the effects of 
segregation on discrimination. These determinants have been given successively by research studies 
that have analysed the existence of discrimination in the housing market. Early studies have generally 
shown that discrimination in the housing market can vary depending on the characteristics of the 
landlord, the type of property rented, the signal of social integration and/or economic stability 
transmitted by the applicant. The intensity of discrimination (D1) then depends on many factors that 
are not necessarily related to the local socio-ethnic composition of the neighbourhood of residence. 
Discriminated populations are discriminated against Becker-style by housing providers, to which 
Arrow-Phelps is added when minorities are presumed to be occupants of lower quality housing. These 
studies suggest that minorities can be discriminated against regardless of the social and ethnic 
composition of the neighbourhood. In line with Scheling's (1971) model of residential segregation 
without any discriminatory behaviour in the housing market, discrimination can be considered 
independent of the socio-ethnic composition of the territory.  
Hypothesis 1. Ethnic minorities are discriminated against in the housing market for any social 
and ethnic composition of the neighbourhood of residence 
 
In the United States, the first studies to take into account the ethnic environment at a disaggregated 
level are those of Yinger (1986), Page (1995) and Roychoudhury & Goodman (1996). For Yinger, the 
root cause of discrimination is economic: real estate agents discriminate to avoid racial prejudice for 
their white clients.  This is the hypothesis of racial prejudice suffered by the clientele. Ondrich et al 
(1999) clearly indicate that "If an agent's customer base is largely white, he may discriminate in order 
to appease actual and potential customers, keeping the group that supplies most of his business feeling 
comfortable". This is customer discrimination as identified by Neumark et al. (1996) in the labour 
market. Landlords and real estate agents will discriminate less against minorities in neighbourhoods 
where they are strongly represented because they will consider that these spaces constitute 
neighbourhoods adapted to the lives of these minorities. According to this mechanism (D2), there is a 
mechanical link between the local socio-ethnic composition and the intensity of discrimination. The 
minority group will potentially be all the more discriminated against as the majority group represents 
a significant proportion of the local population.  
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Hypothesis 2. Due to racial prejudice, there is a growing monotonous link between the 
proportion of residents from the majority population and the intensity of discrimination in 
access to housing.  
 
In Schelling's (1971) models, the location choices of socio-ethnic groups are not linear. There is a 
tipping point corresponding to a given proportion of the minority group beyond which members of the 
majority group will make the choice to leave the neighbourhood irreversibly. If landlords and real 
estate agents have this model in mind, they will try to protect themselves from the risk of losing their 
customers by discriminating more strongly against the minority when its proportion approaches the 
tipping point. Once the threshold is exceeded, it is no longer useful for owners to discriminate against 
minorities.  This suggests a non-linear relationship around the tipping point. This hypothesis of non 
linearity (D3) has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies in the United States. Page (1995) 
showed that the relationship was non-linear, around a tipping point level of around 20%. 
Discrimination increases until the share of the African-American minority reaches this critical mass, 
then declines sharply. Ondrich et al (1999) use indicator sets for the proportion of households from 
the minority group of 0 to 20% and above 20% in the belief that real estate agents will change 
discriminatory behaviour around this threshold for fear of losing their clients from the majority white 
group. As soon as the proportion of residents from the black minority group exceeds the threshold, 
the incentive to discriminate disappears. The study by Card et al (2008) is probably the one that most 
convincingly confirmed the discriminatory consequences of the tipping point hypothesis by using direct 
observations of household residential mobility. It places the tipping point at a variable level depending 
on the city, usually between 5 and 20%. This will be confirmed by the work of Hanson and Hawley 
(2011), for whom discrimination is becoming more pronounced around the "tipping points", 
corresponding to a share of the population from the majority group of between 80% and 95%. Hanson 
and Santas (2014) using larger samples will in turn confirm that landlords begin to discriminate strongly 
when the proportion of people from the minority group becomes too large for them. 
Hypothesis 3. There is a Schelling tipping point beyond which the socio-ethnic composition of 
the neighbourhood can change. To protect themselves against this, suppliers discriminate 
significantly below this threshold and they stop discriminating beyond it. The result is a local 
area of non-linearity in the relationship between segregation and discrimination. 
 
These three sets of determinants are perfectly compatible with each other. We represent them in the 
diagram below, assuming that they can be combined.  The overall relationship between the majority 
group's share in a given neighbourhood and the intensity of discrimination. In a plan where the share 
of the majority group in the local population is shown on the abscissa and the extent of discrimination 
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on the ordinate, the combination of the three hypotheses leads to a particular profile: the curve has a 
positive ordinate (D1), it is generally monotonous increasing (D2) with a local area of non-linearity in 
case of the presence of a tipping point (D3) (figure 2).  
  
Figure 2. The segregation effect on discrimination 
 
All this work is American.  In European countries, there is much less studies providing evidence of a 
relationship between discrimination and the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood. Auspurg, Hinz, 
and Schmid (2017) found no significant discrimination toward Turkish applicants in Germany in area 
where the proportion of Turks is low. Bunel et al (2017) found no significant discrimination toward 
Kanak in New Caledonia in neighbourhoods where the proportion of Kanak is higher than 25%. Baldini 
and Federici (2011) in Italia, Carlsson and Eriksson (2014) in Sweden and Acolin, Bostic, and Painter 
(2016) show regional or local variations in the level of discrimination and suggest that these variations 
could be explained by the demographic composition of the places. To our knowledge, no study in the 
European context provides statistical proofs of a relationship between discrimination and the ethnic 
composition of the neighbourhood. 
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2. Experimental Protocol and Data Collection 
The experiment is an extension of the one conducted by Bunel et al. (2017) in Greater Nouméa 
between October 2015 and February 2016. The second part of the experiment that took place one 
year later, between October 2016 and February 2017. It allows to collect more observations and to 
add new profiles.  
The test is conducted to determine access to private housing for rent and therefore do not covers 
access to social housing and private homes which are indeed rare in the area. We tested all ads for 
apartments for rent in Greater Nouméa published on the reference site http://www.immobilier.nc/, 
which centralizes all real-estate offers in New Caledonia.8 The applicants for rental housing were men, 
making their Kanak, Wallisian or European origin known through their surnames and first names. The 
choice of the surnames and first names corresponds to credible and realistic identities. They are among 
the most common first names for this age-group and for the community to which they belong. 
Surnames unambiguously indicate that a person is of Kanak, Wallisian or European background. The 
order of the response of each type of applicant was randomly changed daily throughout the data 
collection period. The test consisted of ending short and interrogative e-mails in response to ads 
published with a view to requesting a housing unit visit. The following messages were sent:  
 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
Your ad fits the requirement that I am seeking. I would like to arrange a visit to see the apartment. 
What documents do you require? 
Thank you, 
First Name and Surname (our translation) 
 
In order to differentiate statistical discrimination from discrimination based on preference we crossed 
the ethnicity signal with a signal concerning the financial and professional stability of the applicant. 
The following sentence was added to messages sent by some of our fictitious applicants: “I am a civil 
servant and I have just moved to Noumea.” This unambiguously signalled employment stability and on 
average a higher salary, given the indexation policy that exists in this area. To control for the implicit 
signal of the move from metropolitan France, we also add a Kanak applicant who indicates a return 
from metropolitan France. 
As such, four rental applicant profiles were created in the first wave of the experiment (A—European, 
B—European civil servant, C—Kanak, and D—Kanak civil servant). Two applicant profiles were added 
                                               
8 The internet is not the only channel through which housing offers are advertised. Other channels such as newspapers and 
social networks were not taken into account in this study. In addition, in the case of real estate agencies, we retained only 
one offer per agency to avoid detection. 
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in the second wave of the experiment (E—Kanak back from metropolitan France and F—Wallisian). In 
the end, our base contained 3,762 responses to 741 real-estate ads (4 × 342 + 6 × 399).9 
The geographical area we are considering is composed of the city of Nouméa and the municipalities of 
Païta, Mont-Doré and Païta. Nouma is a relatively dense city composed of 8 sectors subdivided into 37 
districts. We have grouped these neighbourhoods and the three neighbouring cities into 14 
homogeneous units according to by grouping the least populated contiguous areas. 
 
3. Results 
Preliminary observations 
Table 1 shows the results of landlords’ responses to our applications for each wave of test separately 
and the aggregate result for the two waves. The ranking of applicants who receive the more responses 
is similar in both waves. The European civil servant receives the highest rate of positive responses 
(69%), followed by the European applicant without stability signal (66%), the Kanak civil servant (60%) 
and the Kanak without stability signal (50%). With regard to the new applicants of the second wave, 
we find that the Kanak who signals a recent return from metropolitan France receives a positive 
response rate of 52%. The Wallisian applicant is the least contacted of the applicants with a positive 
response rate of 43%. 
 
Table 1: Positive responses by wage and by applicant 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 European European 
civil servant 
Kanak civil 
servant 
Kanak Kanak back 
from 
metropolitan 
France 
Wallisian 
 mean Sd mean sd mean sd Mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Positive response 
rate (first wave) 
67.58 46.88 70.00 45.90 65.36 47.65 54.10 49.91     
Observations 330 330 332 329     
Positive response 
rate (second wave) 
64.16 48.01 68.17 46.64 54.33 49.90 47.37 49.99 51.63 50.04 42.61 49.51 
Observations 399 399 300 399 399 399 
Positive response 
rate 
65.71 47.50 69.00 46.28 60.13 49.00 50.41 50.03 51.63 50.04 42.61 49.51 
Observations 729 729 632 728 399 399 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 12 ads for which the landlord call the applicants without leaving a message are excluded of the sample.  
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Figure 3: Positive response rates by profile of applicant 
 
Table 2 compares the positive response rates received by the different profiles of applicants. As Bunel 
et al. (2017) show, the effect of the stability signal appears to be more valued by landlords for a Kanak 
than for an European applicant: the difference in response rate is 3 percentage points between the 
two European applicants against 10 percentage points between the two Kanak applicants. The Kanak 
civil servant has then a 9 percentage points lower rate of response than his European counterpart. It 
is a smaller difference than the 15 percentage points difference between the European and Kanak 
applicants without stability signals.  
These results are in line with the coexistence of two types of discrimination. The difference of response 
rate between Europeans and Kanak that decreases sharply with the stability signal, such as being civil 
servant, indicates the presence of statistical discrimination. The significant difference between the 
European and the Kanak civil servant applicant suggests, to a less extent, existence of a discrimination 
based on preference. 
The Kanak applicant who signals a recent return from metropolitan France gets a small increase in his 
response rate compared to the Kanak applicant without any signal. The response rate of the Wallisian 
applicant is 26 percentage points lower than that of the European civil servant and 23 percentage 
points lower than that of the European applicant. The response rate of the Wallisian is also 8 
percentage points lower than the response rate of the Kanak applicant.  
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We thus find high levels of discrimination in line with works of Carpusor Adrian G. and Loges William 
E. (2006) who find a 33 percentage points lower response rate for African-Americans in the US or Ali 
M. Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008)  who find a 24.8 percentage point lower response rate for 
Arabic/Muslim male names compared to Swedish male names in Sweden.  
 
Table 2: Differences in the Success Rates of Applicants 
 
Deviation 
(in 
Percentage 
Points) 
Standard-
Error 
Student P-value 
European civil servant versus     
European  3.29** 1.37 2.40 0.016 
Kanak civil servant 8.87*** 1.83 4.85 0.000 
Kanak back from Metropolitan France 17.37*** 2.45 7.09 0.000 
Kanak  18.58*** 1.79 10.39 0.000 
Wallisian 26.39*** 2.56 10.33 0.000 
European versus      
Kanak 15.29*** 1.79 8.55 0.000 
Wallisian 23.09*** 2.56 9.04 0.000 
Non-euro (Kanak or Wallisian) 18.06*** 1.75 10.33 0.000 
*** Significant at the 1%, ** the 5%, * the 10% levels. Standard errors are clustered at the landlord level.  
We are now interested in the effect of the neighbourhood’s composition on discrimination. Graphics 
of figure 4 plot the relationship between the difference in response rates between ethnic minority 
applicants and European applicants with the same stability signal and the concentration of European 
in the neighbourhood. Despite the low number of points, there seems to be an increase of the 
discrimination towards the different profiles of non-European applicants when the concentration of 
Europeans increases.  
 
Figure 4: Discrimination and concentration of Europeans 
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Notes: Differences in response rates between each profiles and the European applicant without stability signal 
are presented except for the Kanak civil servant whose response rate is compared to the European civil servant. 
Local polynomial smooth of the difference in response rates on the proportion of European in the neighbourhood 
are plotted in blue and red.  
 
 
Results indicate that a Kanak has a 14 percentage points lower probability of obtaining a positive 
response compared to an European. The response probability of a Wallisian is even lower with a 4 
percentage points reduction compared to the probability of a Kanak and a 19 percentage points 
reduction compared to the probability of an European applicant. Stability signals increase the 
probability for a Kanak to obtain a positive response of 7 percentage points for the quality of civil 
servant and by 4 percentage points for the recent return form metropolitan France. The stability signal 
affects to a lesser extent the European for whom the signal increases the probability of obtaining a 
positive response by 3 percentage points.  
 
Econometric results: causes of variation in discrimination 
 
We first estimate the simple model: 
𝑃(𝑌 = 1|𝛼𝑎 , 𝐾, 𝑊, 𝐶, 𝑋) = 𝛷(𝛼𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐾 + 𝛽2𝑊 +  𝛽3 𝐶 + 𝛽4𝐾 𝐶 +  𝛽5𝑊 𝐶 +  𝛽6 𝑋 ) 
Where 𝑌 equals 1 if the individual receive a positive response.  
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𝐾 = {
1         𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝐾𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑘
0                                           𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
     
𝑊 = {
1    𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑠 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛
0                                           𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
𝛷 is the standard normal cumulative density function. 𝛼𝑎 is a fixed effect that accounts for factors 
unique to each landlord that influence 𝑌. C is a vector of neighbourhood characteristics thought to 
affect the level of discrimination. X is a vector of individual, landlord and housing characteristics that 
potentially affect the probability to obtain a positive response.  
Hypothesis 1 is tested by estimating 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 and hypotheses 2 and 3 are tested by estimating 𝛽4  
and 𝛽5 with different compositions of the vector C. Outcomes that are related to a same offer are not 
independent which is taken into account into the random effects probit. Intraclass correlation is 
around 0.8 which means that 80% of the variance of the probability of any of the fictitious applicants 
being contacted by the landlord is due to the behaviour of the landlord. The relevance of using random 
effects probit models are confirmed by likelihood ratio tests that reject the nullity of intraclass 
correlation at the 5% level. 
Results presented in column (2) of table 3, indicate that a Kanak has a 14 percentage point lower 
probability of obtaining a positive response compared to an European. The response probability of a 
Wallisian is even lower with a 4 percentage points reduction compared to the probability of a Kanak 
and a 19 percentage points reduction compared to the probability of an European applicant. Stability 
signals increase the probability for a Kanak to obtain a positive response of about 8 percentage points 
for the quality of civil servant and by 4 percentage points for the recent return form metropolitan 
France. The stability signal affects to a lesser extent the European for whom the signal increases the 
probability of obtaining a positive response by 3 percentage points.  
In column (3), we test the presence of a linear relationship between discrimination and concentration 
of Europeans (hypothesis 2). The variable % European which measures the location proportion of 
European in each neighbourhood is then introduced in vector C. In column (4), we test for an increase 
of the discrimination around the tipping point (hypothesis 3). This effect is caught by introducing the 
variable Dum % European >60 in vector C. We observe no significant linear relationship between 
discrimination and the concentration of Europeans. However results in column (4) indicate a significant 
increase of 7 percentage points of the discrimination towards the Kanak in neighbourhoods where the 
proportion of Europeans is higher than 60%.10 We observe the same pattern regarding the 
                                               
10 We may note that a model that includes a break in the trend at 60% (not shown) indicates a change in the relationship 
around the tipping point: discrimination does not vary significantly with the neighbourhood composition before 60% but 
increases significantly above this point. Based on the information criteria we keep column (2) and thus a shift in the 
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discrimination towards the Wallisian applicant but this one is not significant. This can be explain by the 
lower number of observations on the Wallisian applicant.11 
In order to verify that the relationship is not due to a correlation between the concentration of 
Europeans and some other characteristics of the neighbourhood as the average rental price, we add 
in column (5) the log of the average rental price and its interaction with discrimination. The results are 
not dramatically modified by this introduction. The estimated coefficient on Kanak ×Dum % European 
>60 is still significant at the 10% level. The decrease in significance is due to an increase of the standard 
errors but not to a decrease of the estimated coefficients which can be explained by the collinearity 
between the average rental price and the concentration of Europeans. The parametric relationship 
that exists between discrimination and concentration of Europeans is shown in figure 5.  
  
                                               
discrimination at the tipping point as our preferred specification.  We may also note that a model that includes both a shift 
in the discrimination and a break in the trend at 60% (not shown) does not perform better in term of information criteria. 
11 The Wallisian applicant has been added on the test only on the second wave of the survey. 
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Table 3: Effect of the composition of the neighbourhood on discrimination (average marginal 
effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Kanak -0.143*** -0.145*** -0.115** -0.130*** -0.311 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.037) (0.019) (0.985) 
Civil servant 0.036** 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Kanak × Civil servant 0.041* 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Metropolitan 0.036* 0.040** 0.039** 0.038** 0.039** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Wallisian -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.150** -0.172*** -0.353 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.046) (0.023) (0.985) 
% European   -0.061 -0.070 -0.070 
   (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
Kanak × % European   -0.024   
   (0.024)   
Wallisian × % European   -0.030   
   (0.034)   
Dum % European >60    0.025 0.028 
    (0.056) (0.058) 
Kanak ×Dum % European >60    -0.066** -0.071* 
    (0.032) (0.043) 
Wallisian ×Dum % European >60    -0.070 -0.075 
    (0.050) (0.058) 
      
Control variables NO YES YES YES YES 
Log(average rental price NO NO YES YES YES 
in the neighbourhood)      
Kanak or Wallisian ×log(average  NO NO NO NO YES 
rental  price in the neighbourhood)      
AIC 3444.898 3268.218 3269.467 3266.944 3268.895 
Number of observations 3616 3453 3453 3453 3453 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the landlord level in parentheses. Control variables are: type of landlord 
(agency or individual), log of the average rent price in the neighbourhood, kitchen in the housing, type of housing 
(F1,F2…), order of the e-mail, set of e-mail, wave of the test (first or second wave). 
 
Figure 5: Difference in positive response probability between the Kanak and the European 
applicant and neighbourhood composition. 
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4. Robustness 
In this section we check for the relevance of alternative tipping points and specifications. In column (1) 
of table 5 we try to delimit more precisely the tipping point. Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) have 
shown that the tipping point was generally situated between 5% and 20% of Afro-Americans in the 
United-States. Neighbourhoods where the concentration of Europeans is very high may not be affected 
by a high level of discrimination because their diversity is not important enough so that a newcomer 
of a different ethnicity might lead the departures of individuals of the major ethnic group. We thus 
test for a lower level of discrimination in the 10% neighbourhoods with the highest levels of Europeans’ 
concentration relatively to the 15% following neighbourhoods.12 Results support a lower level of 
discrimination in the more concentrated neighbourhoods compared to those that are slightly more 
diversified. We also test in columns (2), (3) and (4) for shifts in the discrimination at different level of 
concentration (proportion of European of 25%, 35% and 50%). No significant shifts in the 
discrimination are observable at these levels.  
 
  
                                               
12 This distinction is, however, limited by the few number of neighbourhoods. 
19 
 
Table 4: Test for different tipping points 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
     
Kanak -0.130*** -0.154*** -0.141*** -0.138*** 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.026) (0.022) 
Civil servant 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Kanak ×Civil servant 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Metropolitan 0.038** 0.040** 0.039** 0.039** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Wallisian -0.172*** -0.207*** -0.178*** -0.174*** 
 (0.023) (0.036) (0.032) (0.027) 
% European -0.074 -0.198** -0.126** 0.012 
 (0.046) (0.067) (0.062) (0.061) 
60 < Dum % European < 72 0.011    
 (0.062)    
Kanak × 60< Dum %  -0.082**    
European < 72 (0.040)    
Wallisian × 60< Dum % -0.076    
European < 72 (0.063)    
Dum % European >=72 0.057    
 (0.072)    
Kanak ×Dum % European >= 72 -0.044    
 (0.047)    
Wallisian ×Dum % European >=  -0.060    
72 (0.072)    
Dum % European > 25  0.122**   
  (0.060)   
Kanak ×Dum % European > 25  0.013   
  (0.031)   
Wallisian ×Dum % European >   0.029   
25  (0.043)   
Dum % European > 35   0.073  
   (0.063)  
Kanak ×Dum % European > 35   -0.007  
   (0.028)  
Wallisian ×Dum % European >    -0.015  
35   (0.040)  
Dum % European > 50    -0.133* 
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    (0.070) 
Kanak × Dum % European > 50    -0.016 
    (0.027) 
Wallisian × Dum % European >     -0.031 
50    (0.041) 
     
AIC 3271.298 3267.373 3271.630 3267.791 
Number of observations 3453 3453 3453 3453 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the landlord level in parentheses. Control variables are: type of landlord 
(agency or individual), log of the average rent price in the neighbourhood, kitchen in the housing, type of housing 
(F1,F2…), order of the e-mail, set of e-mail, wave of the test (first or second wave). 
 
Conclusion 
Despite its importance in political discourse, the disparity issue in New Caledonia lacks from precise 
measures of the current situation. However, policy debates on reducing inequalities and discrimination 
require specific analysis and thus would benefit from a better understanding of the factors that affect 
all kind of discrimination and segregation. This study, which aim is to analyse ethnic discrimination in 
the housing market, will contribute to a better understanding of the situation to drive social policies. 
More specifically, our objective is to give empirical evidence on the effect of neighbourhood 
composition on these discriminations. The analyses use the results of correspondence tests for 
European, Kanak and Wallisian applicants on more than 700 ads in the greater Noumea. Linking this 
data set to information about the neighbourhoods in which the rental properties are located, we are 
able to econometrically test, for the first time in an European context, the effect of the ethnic 
composition of the area on discrimination.  
Our results show significant discrimination by landlords against e-mail inquiries from Kanak and 
Wallisian applicants in the rental housing market. Discrimination diminishes but does not disappear 
when the European applicant and the Kanak applicant give signals of stability. This result confirms the 
presence of statistical discrimination but also indicates, to a lesser extent, the presence of preference 
based discrimination.   
We reject at the 5 percent level the homogeneity of discrimination towards the Kanak applicant 
according to the ethnic composition of the neighbourhood. We find that discrimination is higher in 
neighbourhoods where the share of Europeans is over 60%. In consequence, we provide new evidence 
of the presence of a tipping point in the composition of neighbourhoods and its impact on the level of 
discrimination.  
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Annexe  
Table A1: Characteristics of Offers 
Characteristics of the offer 
and the company 
First wave Second wave 
 In % of Offers Standard 
deviation 
In % of Offers Standard 
deviation 
Type of landlord     
Agencies 19  11  
Individuals 81  89  
     
Size of apartments     
F1 16  20  
F2 38  39  
F3 30  26  
F4 16  15  
LOFT 0  0  
     
Game A 44  50  
Male landlord 51  50  
Kitchen in the house 92  99  
Rent 133,803 57,392 116,172 41,290 
Surface 65 29 63 34 
Average price per m2 (CFP 
franc) 
2,192 548 2,089 694 
     
Observations 1,368 2,394 
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